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Zusammenfassung 
Recht und Ordnung in der Europäischen Union: Eine Erklärung der Unterschiede zwischen 
Mitgliedstaaten bezüglich der Einhaltung europäischer Normen 
 
Die Einhaltung (compliance) europäischer Normen kann durch die einschlägigen Erklärungs-
ansätze der Enforcement- und Management-Schule nicht hinreichend erklärt werden, weder 
hinsichtlich der zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten variierenden Zahl von Normverletzungen 
noch der Zahl, der durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof geregelter Fälle. Eine Erklärung der 
hier beschriebenen Muster der Nicht-Einhaltung benötigt zusätzlich eine Analyse der Verfah-
rensdimension, die den Grad der Autonomie der EU-Kommissare gegenüber ihren eigenen 
nationalen Parlamente berücksichtigt. Mit Hilfe einer multivariaten Analyse der EG-Vertrags-
verletzungen zwischen 1978 und 2000 wird untersucht, warum Normeinhaltung durch den 
Europäischen Gerichtshof in bestimmten Fällen erreicht wurde, in anderen jedoch nicht. Es 
wird unter anderem gezeigt, dass eine Erhöhung der demokratischen Legitimität europäi-
schen Regierens negative Auswirkungen auf seine Effektivität im Hinblick auf die Einhaltung 
europäischen Primärrechts hat, das heißt der ratifizierungspflichtigen Verträge bzw. Vertrags-
änderungen. Die Ergebnisse haben erhebliche Implikationen für das Verständnis des europäi-
schen Integrationsprozesses, gerade angesichts des nach wie vor bestehenden Demokratiede-
fizits der EU. Bevor den Bürgern nicht eine stärkere Kontrolle der EU Gesetzgebung über 
das europäische Parlament zugestanden wird und Europäisches Recht damit stärker dem 
nationalen Recht entspricht, wird eine Mitgliedschaft in der EU im immer stärkeren Maße 
weniger Privilegien bedeuten aber mehr lästige Rechtspflichten. 
Schlüsselwörter 
gesetzmäßige Einhaltung, demokratisches Defizit, EU-Recht, einheitlicher Binnenmarkt 
iv 
Abstract 
Law and Order in the European Union: Explaining Variations in Compliance with European 
Union Law 
 
Neither the enforcement nor the management schools of compliance can explain cross-
national variation in the number of violations of European Union law or in the number of 
cases settled by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). These patterns of non-compliance 
require the inclusion of the procedural dimension of compliance, which is affected by the 
degree of autonomy executives have vis-à-vis their national parliaments. Multivariate analysis 
was applied to a database of violations of the European Community Treaty from 1978 to 
2002, to determine why violations may or may not be settled by the ECJ. The results show 
that increasing the amount of democratic legitimacy in the European governance process can 
limit its effectiveness in the area of compliance with EU primary legislation, namely, the EC 
Treaty. This has important implications for understanding the process of European integra-
tion, given the continued existence of a democratic deficit in the EU. Unless democratic 
pathways are created which would allow EU citizens to shape the EU legislative process via 
their national representatives to the European Parliament such that European law would 
conflict less with national law, EU membership will increasingly mean fewer privileges and 
more onerous legal obligations. 
Keywords 
compliance; democratic deficit; EU law; single internal market 
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I. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) can challenge democratically approved legislation by targeting 
national laws and practices as not being in compliance with primary EU legislation, 
namely, the Treaty of the European Communities (EC Treaty), and associated regula-
tions. Even though changes in these laws were not the original intent or cause for the 
member states’ decisions to cooperate, national governments increasingly face the di-
lemma of either following the preferences of their constituents and maintaining the status 
quo, or complying with the demands of EU supranational institutions and fulfilling their 
supranational obligations. Thus, the governments of the member states face a constant 
political dilemma. They must either comply with their supranational legal obligations or 
maintain current national policies that are approved through democratic institutions. This 
article addresses the question as to how national governments deal with this dilemma 
across fifteen member states of the European Union.  
The contrasting patterns of compliance with the EU’s legal rules and obligations 
serve as an excellent laboratory to determine how this political dilemma is solved com-
paratively across the EU-15.1 Looking closer at the cross-national distribution of viola-
tions of EU law and the stage at which they are settled, there are clear differences be-
tween the reasons why some states violate the EU law more often than others, and the 
capacity or willingness to settle these violations. Current theories of compliance in the 
international relations literature cannot readily explain these differences, because the 
theories operationalize compliance in simple, dichotomous terms. Instead, compliance 
with any law beyond the nation-state should be conceived as containing a politics of 
process as well as political conflict over the substance of the violation. The degree to 
which national executives can deliberate and legislate independently of the influence of 
national parliaments affects how smoothly this process operates. Using quantitative 
methods with data covering over 1200 violations of the articles and regulations associated 
with the Treaty of the European Community, my findings suggest that increased parlia-
mentary involvement in the process of compliance inhibits European governance under 
certain circumstances. The empirical analysis implies important consequences for the 
future of governance in the EU. If national governments choose to increase the amount 
of democratic space available to deliberate and contest the nature of EU governance, they 
may be jeopardizing the effectiveness of EU governance as well. 
II. The Process of Compliance in the EU 
The supranational institutions constituting the EU have increased their power and au-
thority over their member states to an extent that is more than any other global-level 
institution in any other region of the world. With the exception of judicial affairs and 
                                                          
1 The “EU-15” include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
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foreign and defense policies, Pillars Two and Three of the European Union, respectively, 
almost no area of national policymaking is immune to interference by supranational 
European institutions.2 Unlike many other institutional settings, the European Union now 
possesses a set of institutions and mechanisms in order to enforce the goals associated 
with negative integration (Pollack 1997; Tallberg 2002). Thus, it is difficult to dismiss the 
fact that EU institutions have reconstituted international politics within the region into a 
new type of polity (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996; Kohler-Koch 1999; Stone Sweet 
1999). As the European Commission addresses issues “behind national borders” that 
threaten completion of the internal market, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) serves as 
the final arbiter over any dispute between the Commission and a member state.3 In addi-
tion, suspected conflicts between national and European law are settled through adjudica-
tion in national courts under article 234 of the EC Treaty (Alter 2000; Conant 2002). 
Together with legal integration fostered by cooperative actions by the Commission, the 
ECJ, and transnational interest groups, the EU is now a case par exemplar of an interna-
tional regime in the “post-national constellation,” which is able to intervene in the domes-
tic affairs of its members by targeting national legislation approved by an elected majority, 
which clashes with EU norms and rules (Zürn 2004). 
One must clearly define what is meant here by compliance, especially given its di-
verse conceptualizations within the EU studies literature.4 The dependent variable in 
compliance studies in the EU, whether qualitative or quantitative, ranges from the 
amount of time necessary to transpose a directive correctly, to whether these directives 
are applied correctly or enforced domestically (Krislov, Ehlermann et al. 1986; Siedentopf 
and Ziller 1988; Duina 1997; Lampinen and Uusikyla 1998; Ciavarini Azzi 2000; Börzel 
2001; Falkner, Treib et al. 2005; Mastenbroek 2005). In contrast to these studies, non-
compliance is defined here as a particular type of state behavior, action, or policy that 
violates an established rule. What compliance means can change over time as a national 
law is re-interpreted and comes into conflict with new supranational precedents or rules. 
Non-compliance also emerges frequently simply because it is impossible to fully antici-
pate the diverse ways states can behave, and how or when they may come into conflict 
with their international legal obligations. Nevertheless, it is still possible to observe objec-
tively whether states are complying with the rules as the latter are inter-subjectively under-
stood among authorized actors (Zürn 2005). In contrast, correct legal implementation and 
application of a directive are instances in which legislative output and its effects are meas-
ured against a policy’s goals, not whether current practices or behaviors are permitted by 
a particular rule. Moreover, given that directives allow the member states to devise their 
own methods to accomplish EU policy aims, the comparative politics of EU directive 
                                                          
2 The extent to which EU institutions and laws govern state practices varies according to policy. Never-
theless, since EU law is superior and prior to national law, any policy that falls under Pillar One of the 
EU Treaty is governed and subject to EU monitoring and supervision.  
3 See Tallberg (2002) for the reasons why the Commission was awarded these powers. 
4 For an excellent survey of the literature and statement on the state of the art, see Mastenbroek (2005). 
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implementation is not the most fruitful realm to compare theories of compliance.5 As 
figures 1 and 2 show, the cross-national variation and change over time, which one seeks 
to explain, depend significantly on the type of law under investigation. 
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Figure 1: EU Infringements by Type of Law; Number at Reasoned Opinion Stage 
Source: European Commission, Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, 1978-2002, 
Brussels 
Whenever there are conflicts between national laws and EU rules, the Commission uses a 
series of highly legalized procedures in order to obtain compliance. Once a violation is 
detected, the Commission initiates a series of informal discussions with the member state 
in attempt to settle the issue without resorting to the formal procedures under articles 226 
and 228 of the EC Treaty. If the Commission considers the state’s practice a violation of  
 
                                                          
5 Since I am testing whether the procedural or substantive dimension of non-compliance better explains 
the variation in EU compliance and not whether compliance is a problem or not, using the EC Treaty 
and its associated regulations as the source of non-compliance does not generate selection bias. Fur-
thermore, directives as a form of supranational rulemaking are relatively unique to the EU context. 
Given that my interest here is to develop a theory of comparative compliance for a wide variety of in-
ternational institutional settings, it is more reasonable to focus on the hard law of the EU.  
 4 
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Figure 2: Violations of EU Law Over Time, 1982-2002, per Type of EU Law 
Source: European Commission, Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law 1978-2002, 
Brussels 
supranational law, or if the state has not responded to the communication sent by the 
Commission within a specific time period, a Formal Letter of Notification is sent. It 
explains the nature of the violation and calls for the member state to meet its legal obliga-
tions, without necessarily determining what methods that would involve. If the Commis-
sion still believes that the state has not taken the necessary measures to comply, formal 
procedures under article 226 begin with the public issuance of a Reasoned Opinion.  
The Reasoned Opinion stipulates the legal grounds by which the Commission de-
termines that a violation has occurred, why the arguments presented by the member state 
are unsatisfactory, and/or why the changes in national practices, either suggested or 
implemented, are insufficient. If the member state still fails to respond or address the 
Commission’s concerns, the case is referred to the ECJ for settlement. The notice of 
referral to the ECJ provides the member state and the Commission with one last chance 
to come to a settlement before the ECJ makes a ruling. If the member state still refuses to 
comply with the ECJ’s ruling, the Commission can invoke article 228 and the violation 
process begins again. If the Court finds that the member state still has not complied with 
the demands of the Commission, the Commission can impose financial penalties. 
As Jonas Tallberg and others have shown, compliance is eventually obtained through 
the use of these procedures (Tallberg 2002; Börzel 2003). For example, Tallberg points 
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out that the number of cases declines almost exponentially as one moves from one stage 
of the compliance process to the next, such that eventually 100% compliance is obtained 
(Tallberg 2002: 619). Tracing the stage at which violations of just the Treaty of the Euro-
pean Community and its associated regulations are settled confirms the claim that the 
member states eventually comply. But is this evidence of the effectiveness of the mecha-
nisms associated with the enforcement school of compliance? A closer analysis of the 
evidence within the European Union suggests that it is premature to consider the use of 
these procedures as evidence in support of the enforcement approach. 
The Explanatory Limits of Enforcement and Management Mechanisms 
The enforcement school of compliance argues that states only comply with international 
law if it is in their interest to do so. If an agreement or other form of international regula-
tion does not reflect a state’s own interest (Downs, Rocke et al. 1996; Goldsmith and 
Posner 2005), then only the application of sanctions which impose sufficiently high costs 
on the violating state will deter cheating (Downs and Rocke 1995; Downs 1998). There 
are good reasons to doubt whether these mechanisms explain the EU’s excellent record 
on compliance. First, in the EU, the threat of sanctions is not very credible. Fines have 
only been imposed three times in the EU’s history.6 While the sanctioning device is de-
signed to discourage any non-compliance by making non-compliance more costly eco-
nomically than maintaining the status quo, article 228 is rarely employed (less than 5% of 
violations reach this stage). Moreover, states had complied with EU law even before the 
sanctioning mechanism was awarded to the governing institutions by the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1993.7 For almost 30 years, the member states complied with ECJ decisions in 
the vast majority of cases, even though the EU lacked any sanctioning mechanism what-
soever. 
If an international institution hopes to sanction an offender of the law, monitoring 
must also be included. While the Commission possesses the power to sanction, it cannot 
account for the widespread variation in the number of violations committed by the mem-
ber states. The Commission certainly lacks a sufficient amount of resources to adequately 
police the correct implementation and application of hundreds of EU directives, as well 
as whether states are following the tenets of the EC Treaty and its associated regulations 
or hard law. As a result, the Commission relies on private individuals, inquiries from the 
European Parliament, and, albeit rarely, other member states, in addition to its own inves-
tigations, to monitor the application of EU law. However, despite these limitations, the 
Commission cannot explain why some states violate EU law more often than others.  
                                                          
6 See Commission v. Greece (Kouroupitos Rubbish Tip II) Case C-387/97, [2000] ECR I-5047; Case C-
304/02 Commission v. France [2005] ECR 0001; Case C-278/01, Commission v Spain, [2003] ECR I-
14141. 
7 Tallberg (2002) provides no methodologically sound evidence that deterrence is working. For example, 
it is unclear whether the presence of a sanctioning mechanism and the absence of non-compliance 
prove that sanctions are responsible. 
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If the sanctions were sufficient to deter all violations, we would not just observe little 
variation among the states that violated EU law, but also little variation in the distribution 
of those cases that were settled by the ECJ. For example, figure 3 displays the total num-
ber of violations of the EC Treaty and the total number of European Court cases across 
the member states. However, when considering the percentage of violations for each state 
that are settled by the ECJ, there is a clear transformation in the ranking of member states 
(see figure 4). 
France, Italy, and Greece violate the EC Treaty and its associate regulations most of-
ten. In terms of settlement, however, while the usual suspects—Greece, Belgium, and 
Italy—rank relatively high, a significant proportion of violations committed by Denmark 
and Luxembourg are settled by the European Court of Justice as well, albeit those viola-
tions occur quite infrequently. 
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Figure 3: Total Number of Violations and ECJ Decisions 1978-2000 
Source: European Commission, Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, Brussels 
Tallberg suggests that compliance is eventually achieved because the EU employs mecha-
nisms which are characteristic of the management school of compliance. The manage-
ment approach proffered argues that non-compliance is often inadvertent and uninten-
tional (Chayes and Chayes 1995). Rather than the result of rational calculation, non- 
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Figure 4: Settlement Practices Among 15 EU Member States 
Source: European Commission, Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, 1983-2002, 
Brussels 
compliance occurs because states do not possess sufficient resources and are not given 
the necessary technical, financial, or administrative resources to comply (Chayes and 
Chayes 1995; Jacobson and Weiss 1995). Again, the EU does provide a significant 
amount of resources in the form of financial and technical assistance, especially to poorer 
regions of the EU (Tallberg 2002: 630). Yet, even if some states are granted additional aid 
to meet the demands of EU law, the management approach cannot explain why some 
states are more reluctant than others to settle their violations of EU law. Controlling for 
the number of violations that states commit, we see a diverse set of countries exhibiting a 
wide range of technical, economic, and administrative capacity, from wealthy states like 
Denmark and Luxembourg, to Greece, the state which most often goes to court. There is 
also little evidence that the member states are given financial assistance while attempting 
to comply with a particular rule. In addition, in most cases, the rules and regulations 
contained in the Treaty of the European Community require states to abstain from cer-
tain practices, not meet newly specified targets or policy goals, which suggests that capac-
ity issues are irrelevant to compliance problems. 
 8 
The Process of Compliance 
The management and enforcement schools share a common misconception of the prob-
lem of compliance. Complying with the law, either domestic or international, is not a 
condition limited to two separate categories—compliance and non-compliance. Rather, 
compliance with the law often involves a process that moves from the detection of a 
violation, to deliberation, debate over the nature of the violation, then development of a 
shared interpretation of the law, until, finally, actions are taken to prevent further infrac-
tions in the future. As such, most international institutional settings require that national 
political actors, usually governmental executives, engage in a process of legalized dispute 
resolution with international institutions, in order to generate compliance or avoid non-
compliance (Franck 1995; Koh 1997; Chayes, Chayes et al. 1998; Abbott, Keohane et al. 
2001). 
What I call the procedural dimension of compliance shares some of the key theoreti-
cal assumptions and mechanisms developed in the social constructivist literature. For 
example, the legal procedures employed to secure compliance in the EU are an excellent 
illustration of how justificatory discourse and deliberation, or “arguing,” occurs in the 
international system (Kratochwil 1989; Risse 2000). States must deliberate with interna-
tional institutions composed of highly trained experts, chiefly lawyers, to defend the 
country’s actions under the principles of law as defined and interpreted at that time. 
When national governments and international institutions charged with enforcing the law 
cannot agree on the meaning and intent of the law, states will comply with the dictates of 
international courts, especially in the European Union, because to do so is perceived as 
the appropriate form of state practice in an international system constituted by the norm 
of multilateralism (Reus-Smit 1999; Reus-Smit 2003; Reus-Smit 2004). 
While constructivist accounts of international law are sufficient to explain why states 
in the contemporary international system will comply with their international legal obliga-
tions, such accounts fail to consider that the content of these norms and rules will often 
conflict with at least equally legitimate norms and rules at the national level. National 
governments must comply with their domestic legal obligations, particularly those that are 
approved by a democratic majority, and at the same time comply with their EU legal 
obligations. Just as legal authority and obligation is constituted in the international system, 
national leaders obviously must follow the rule of law at the national level as well. There-
fore, the question posed here is not whether states follow their international legal obliga-
tions: states in the modern international system do so for a variety of reasons (Henkin 
1979; Franck 1990; Simmons 1998; Young 1999; Abbott, Keohane et al. 2001; Goldsmith 
and Posner 2005). Rather, we are interested in how national governments balance these 
conflicting principles when the policies and practices of a state violate supranational rules. 
Just as national governments and international institutions deliberate with each other over 
the meaning of the law, justify particular types of behavior, and consider what the proper 
remedies are, individual parliamentarians must also be persuaded of these new interpreta-
tions of the law. If national parliamentarians are not convinced, an interpretation of the 
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law must be imposed on a member state by the European Court of Justice. When dis-
putes are settled by the ECJ, a final, authoritative interpretation of EU law is given. If 
members of parliament still refuse to change the status quo, they risk violating the higher 
norm of challenging the authority of the Court and the EU legal system itself. Since this 
norm is more firmly entrenched than any specific legal norm about the meaning of the 
free movement of goods, for example, members of parliaments will cede to the Court’s 
interpretation of the law. In the European Union, given the relatively meager level of 
democratic input and the amount of power the Commission and ECJ have, it is crucial to 
understand how national executives balance these two types of normative and legal de-
mands. 
The Benefits of Moral Hazard 
The ability of national executives to balance these often conflicting demands depends on 
the relative autonomy they have from their respective national parliaments. As in many 
other areas of national policymaking, members of parliament face a fundamental tradeoff 
between granting significant powers to the national executive to make foreign policy 
decisions while maintaining influence over the policy outcome (Destler 1978; Haggard 
1990; Lohmann 1994).8 The tradeoff resembles the fundamental debate all democracies 
must address. While the policies that governments propose should reflect the preferences 
of a majority of the electorate, some degree of autonomy and independence is often 
granted to national executives in order for these policies to be efficiently implemented.  
The reasons parliaments delegate to national executives are widely recognized. Dele-
gation to national executives takes place in order to reap the gains from allowing those 
individuals or groups with particular expertise to solve complex social problems. Delega-
tion also occurs so that parliamentarians can manage the task of governing more effi-
ciently and concentrate on issues that are of more direct concern to their constituents. 
The dangers of delegation are also well known. Agents can often act against the interests 
of the principals, either by “shirking” their duties or pursuing goals which are not in the 
interests of the principals. Although the problem of “moral hazard” is prevalent in many 
different policy areas, it is a constant threat vis-à-vis matters of foreign policy. Problems 
of delegation are solved through both ex ante mechanisms such as effective screening and 
contract design, and post hoc mechanisms which include monitoring and reporting re-
quirements as well as institutional checks (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). In parliamen-
tary democracies, there is a greater reliance on ex ante mechanisms of control because 
there are generally fewer institutional constraints, fewer agents directly accountable to 
voters, and fewer competing agents. The reliance on these screening mechanisms coin-
                                                          
8 This argument contradicts the assumptions in Lisa Martin’s (2000) theory of democratic commitment. 
While Martin may be correct about the ability of legislative participation to control the outcome of in-
ternational agreements, inevitably, due to ambiguity in the rules, changing circumstances, or redefined 
state interests, problems of compliance will develop. When these problems develop, low amounts of 
delegation will inhibit the ability to cooperate. 
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cides with the stronger role political parties have in parliamentary systems relative to 
presidential ones (Strøm 2000). However, this does not imply that national parliaments 
are entirely devoid of post hoc mechanisms for monitoring and control. In fact, all four 
mechanisms suggested by Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991) are present among the EU 
member states, albeit to varying degrees. 
The most effective way for national parliaments to limit the possibility of moral haz-
ard is for national parliamentarians to develop monitoring mechanisms which increase 
their own expertise regarding a particular matter and the amount of information available 
to them. Committee systems do exactly that. According to Ingvar Mattson and Kaare 
Strøm, committees can obtain private information about policy being made, they can 
make tradeoffs with other committee members in order solve collective action problems, 
and they are extensions of the party system whereby party discipline can be maintained 
(Mattson and Strøm 1995). 
Whenever member states attempt to comply with EU rules, strong committee struc-
tures will make it more difficult to reach a shared interpretation of a rule. Committees 
amplify the voice of a legislative representative or groups of representatives. They not 
only allow the parliament to better monitor deliberations between the national executive 
and international bodies, but also begin, themselves, to participate, bringing diverse inter-
ests and points of view of the law with them. Committee strength also increases the 
ability of members of parliament to determine the precise impact that compliance with an 
international rule will have domestically. Assuming that a national executive would be 
more concerned about the long-term reputation and interests of the state than would an 
individual member of parliament, we should expect that, as parliamentary committees 
increase in power, the parochial interests of these members are more likely to be articu-
lated than the collective interests of the state. 
Parliamentary committees, therefore, make deliberation more difficult by increasing 
the number of participants, thereby reducing the chance that a settlement is easily 
reached. Since members of parliament are also likely to be more concerned with meeting 
the demands of their local constituencies than complying with the demands of interna-
tional law, they are more likely to delay the settlement process. Members of parliament 
can monitor national executives and their dealings with international organizations, re-
gardless of whether parliamentary representatives obtain their desired outcomes or not. 
My first hypothesis is: 
H1: The more powerful committees are in national parliaments, the more likely it is 
that violations of international law will be settled by an international court. 
Once a shared understanding is reached, state policy must be corrected. In most cases, 
this means the passage of national legislation. If members of parliament are able to influ-
ence the legislative product that is meant to regenerate compliance, it is more likely that 
this new legislative product will deviate from the demands of the European Commission 
or ECJ. In contrast, if the national executive can control the legislative process, it is less 
likely that the final legislative product will significantly deviate from the EU’s legal de-
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mands. When national parliamentarians can affect the course and content of the “compli-
ance bill,” delays in compliance will occur. More importantly, their participation will limit 
the transformative effect of compliance. Rather than completely transforming national 
law to comply with international obligations, legislators make changes only at the legal 
margins, creating the risk that similar problems of non-compliance will occur in the fu-
ture. 
H2: As national executive autonomy increases in terms of both the control of the 
legislative agenda and less parliamentary oversight, violations are less likely to be 
settled by the European Court of Justice. 
If national parliaments are able to more effectively monitor the actions of the national 
executive and co-deliberate, the process of compliance will be slowed. National parlia-
mentarians must be effectively persuaded that changes to the law are necessary. However, 
in the European Union, there exists a final authority concerning conflicts between na-
tional and European law: the European Court of Justice. The ECJ, therefore, serves as 
one last stop in the compliance process to force a member state to comply with interna-
tional law. When national parliaments refuse to make changes in the national status quo 
and comply, often only a ruling by the ECJ will generate the sufficient amount of “com-
pliance pull” to force parliaments to accept changes in the legislative status quo. As long 
as a ruling by the ECJ, or the ECJ itself, is viewed as legitimate, the ruling has the force of 
law and parliamentary opposition is suspended. When the ECJ makes a ruling, even 
national parliamentarians are now persuaded that they must abide by their international 
legal obligations due to the normative requirement of obeying the law.  
III. Data and Analysis 
Measuring Parliamentary Structures 
The input of national parliaments in the compliance process is measured in two ways: the 
extent to which the national executive dominates the legislative agenda and the role of 
parliamentary committees. Herbert Döring (1995), in an exhaustive analysis, created an 
index of executive power based on the government’s ability to guide a bill through the 
legislative process without influence from parliamentary committees or the opposition. 
However, the legislative process is only one setting in which the executives exercise their 
dominance over legislatures. Other factors include an executive’s relative power in general 
and the strength of individual members of parliament (King 1994). Alan Siaroff  (2003) 
moves beyond previous measures by assembling each of these factors into a single index 
of executive dominance of the legislature.9 Independent from an executive’s dominance in 
                                                          
9 Through factor analysis, Siaroff (2003) determines which variables constituting the legislative-executive 
relationship most often group together. His findings suggest that the following variables are most 
strongly associated with qualities describing the nature of the executive-legislature relationship: govern-
ment control of the plenary agenda, restrictions on the introduction of private members’ bills, the ple-
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the parliamentary system is the ability of parliamentary committees to monitor and over-
see the activities of the national executive. This is a function of the degree to which public 
officials or members of parliament outside the government can participate in decision 
making and shape the development of policy. Siaroff’s (2003) variable, “levels of policy 
centralization,” best captures the ability of committees and other institutional actors to 
influence policy.10 Together, these two variables capture the degree to which we are likely 
to observe moral hazard or the ability of national executives to escape accountability and 
monitoring by a national parliament. 
The Enforcement and Management Approaches: Interests and Capacities 
If the structure of executive-parliamentary relations affects the process of settling a viola-
tion, then the reasons why states fail to settle their violations should be independent from 
the reasons why these violations are committed. If not, then the reasons for the violation 
should explain both the number of violations committed by a member state over time 
and those settled by the ECJ. Next, I briefly outline those possible causes as they relate to 
the EC Treaty and then test these hypotheses using data collected from the Commission’s 
Annual Reports Monitoring the Application of European Community Law. 
In order to test the enforcement hypothesis, we need to know what policies or prac-
tices states are carrying out that challenge the rules and regulations contained in the EC 
Treaty and its associated regulations. If the enforcement approach is correct, then states 
only comply when the threat of sanctions outweighs the benefits of maintaining the status 
quo. Those benefits depend on the policies in place at the national level, which, in turn, 
shape a state’s interest in complying. While some states violate specific policy areas more 
often than others, there is little evidence that this affects the general patterns of either the 
number of violations that states commit each year or the stage at which they are settled. 
Most violations of the EC Treaty and associated regulations are in the area of the single 
market (see figure 5). 
There are several ways to account for the general distribution of violations. First, 
since the EC Treaty is directed towards establishing a single market, we should expect 
those countries who trade more with other EU countries to comply more often than 
countries who trade less with other member states. This is measured as national trade 
with the EU, as percentage of total gross domestic product. Second, if violations of the  
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
nary first determines the principles of a bill, the ability of committees to rewrite legislation, the influence 
of committee members on party positions, are money bills a prerogative of government, the ability to 
curtail debate before the final vote in a parliamentary bureau or presidium, there is a recognized leader 
of the opposition, the presence of single-member electoral system and, finally, the general power of the 
prime minister. 
10 Policy centralization consists of: not over 10 standing committees corresponding to government de-
partments, government control of committee chairs, ability to dissolve parliament easily, ministers are 
members of parliament or cannot be, ministers are generalists or specialists, and levels of corporatism 
(Siaroff 2003: 458). 
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Figure 5: Policy Areas of the EC Treaty Violated (1982-2002) 
EC Treaty reflect conditions at the status quo rather than the prospect of future gains 
related to EU trade, then we should expect that the extent to which regulatory obstacles 
exist at the national level would determine both the number of violations and the ability 
to settle them. These restrictions are measured by Kaufmann et al.’s (2003) indicator of 
“regulatory quality”. Constructed from a variety of sources, regulatory quality refers to the 
number of “market-unfriendly” policies such as price controls and perceptions of exces-
sive regulation in the area of foreign trade and business development.11 
European integration within the EU can also challenge the institutional regimes used 
to govern the “mixed economy” as it is practiced differently across the EU member 
states, especially in the case of EU hard law related to the EC Treaty (Scharpf 1999; Van 
Apeldoorn 2002). If so, we should expect center-left or social democratic governments to 
violate EU law most often. Partisanship of national government is measured as the rela-
tive political center of gravity of the governing cabinet, or the political party’s share of 
seats in parliament multiplied by the party’s ideological position, according to the Left-
Right index developed by the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge et al. 2001).12  
                                                          
11 Regulatory quality is a composite measure of several surveys that rate the effectiveness and discrimina-
tory nature of government regulations. They include the use of unfair competitive practices, price con-
trols, discriminatory tariffs, and excessive protection of particular industries. Regulatory quality is also a 
function of whether necessary business laws are in place and the efficiency of the governance tax sys-
tem. For a complete list of sources and factors that comprise this variable, see Kaufmann et al. (2003: 
94). 
12 Thomas Cusack kindly provided the data. The ideological dimension is based on Budge et al.’s (2001) 
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There is also increasing evidence that cleavages regarding relative support and oppo-
sition to the EU are becoming increasingly salient among the member states (Marks and 
Steenbergen 2004). If true, and assuming that these preferences towards the EU are 
salient and operative at the political level, then those countries with higher percentages of 
their general population in opposition to the EU should violate the EC Treaty most often 
and be most reluctant to comply. Support for the EU is measured as the net approval of 
the EU by individuals in the member states from 1978 to 2002.13 Including individual 
attitudes towards the EU raises the issue of relevancy to the problem of compliance. A 
better measure of how EU attitudes affect compliance would be a measure of the prefer-
ences of political parties in office. However, since comprehensive cross-national and 
cross-temporal data are not yet available, Eurobarometer responses serve as the best 
source of cross-national and cross-temporal domestic attitudes towards the EU.14 Testing 
the relationship between citizens’ attitudes and compliance patterns must not imply a 
direct causal connection. Instead, my purpose here is to test how public attitudes towards 
the EU are associated with compliance outcomes and whether institutional factors at the 
state level either ignore or overcome those attitudes.15 
The non-compliance we observe may also be a function of those who actually create 
the rules and hence based on their national interests. If the EU merely represents another 
international institution which provides mutual benefits to its members, and the rules are 
based on the relative bargaining capacities of the member states, then we should expect 
the largest EU member states to be the ones controlling the regulatory process (Moravc-
sik 1998: chapter 2). Similarly, Geoffrey Garrett (1992, 1995) argues that the decisions 
made by the ECJ towards an increasingly integrated Europe reflect the latent preferences 
of the largest member states, in particular France and Germany.16 If either argument is 
                                                                                                                                                                       
CMP scale, which ranges from –100 for very left governments to 100 for very right wing governments.  
The ideological dimension was constructed from a composite of twenty-four salience measures of policy 
positions based on the categorical system of the CMP project. It reflects the degree to which the party’s 
electoral manifesto emphasizes either left or right policy positions. 
13 The specific question asked by the Eurobarometer is: “Generally speaking, do you think your country’s 
membership is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good or bad.” Net approval is constructed as the 
percentage of people in each member state that view EU membership as a good thing minus those who 
choose a “bad thing.” Most of the data was kindly provided by Richard C. Eichenberg and updated to 
include Luxembourg. 
14 Most surveys of political parties’ attitudes to the EU are based on Leonard Ray’s (1999) survey, updated 
by Marks and Hooghe (1999). The survey is limited, however, to quadrennial intervals and does not 
code for whether a particular party is in government. 
15 If a robust relationship is determined to exist, then further research must determine the mechanisms 
that connect or disconnect the impact of public attitudes towards the EU and governmental behavior 
regarding compliance with EU law. 
16 Rational neo-institutionalism in the study of the EU offers a strong critique of the theoretical founda-
tions of Morvavsik’s approach. This research focuses on the everyday politics of the EU and the ways in 
which the institutional rules structure decision-making the in EU (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). The au-
thors show that the European Parliament’s role in EU legislative matters has strengthened considerably 
through reforms enacted by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. However, these conclusions do 
not challenge my argument. Tsebelis and Garrett (op. cit.) argue that political integration will proceed as 
long as members of the European Parliament continue to support integration, while ignoring the de-
mands of the European citizenry. If true, and given that the content of “integrationist” legislation is 
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correct, then we should expect the smaller member states to violate EU law most often 
and to comply only reluctantly. The relative strength of a member state is measured as a 
function of the number of votes a member state has in the Council of Ministers.  
Each of the hypotheses above tests the enforcement approach by identifying the 
relative interest states have in complying. If the enforcement approach explains both the 
origin and settlement process of an infringement, then no change should be observed in 
terms of the variables that explain the number of infringements committed and the likeli-
hood that an infringement is settled by the ECJ. The management approach, on the other 
hand, suggests that non-compliance does not result from a state’s lack of interest, but 
from the lack of resources to adequately meet a rule’s obligations. And, the acquis commun-
autaire is a plethora of rules, regulations, and technical standards which require extensive 
training and expertise in their mastering. The more professional and efficient bureaucra-
cies are, the more likely it is that we would witness not only fewer violations, but also 
quicker settlement of violations. Moreover, once a particular interpretation of EU law is 
made regarding a conflicting item of national law, professional and efficient bureaucracies 
are more likely to make extensive changes in national regulatory practices, such that the 
violation does not recur. In order to gauge a bureaucracy’s relative ability to internalize 
EU legal interpretations of the law, I rely on Kaufmann et al.’s (2003) indicator of relative 
government effectiveness.17 Weaker and ineffective bureaucracies are expected to have 
more problems adjusting to the plethora of legal demands established at the EU level. 
Some important caveats about the nature of these variables and their measurement 
are worth mentioning. First, the scores for regulatory quality and government effective-
ness are only available for biennial periods starting in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. In 
order to make use of as much data as possible, the average scores for each of these vari-
ables was calculated and then assigned to previous years in the sample. While a question-
able technique, there are several good reasons why this is acceptable here. First, there is 
not a great deal of variation over time among these countries. Therefore, there is little 
reason to expect that a state’s relative ranking among other EU member states would 
change significantly. If there was any significant change over time, we can assume that a 
country’s scores related to government effectiveness have only improved over time. Thus, 
any bias produced as a result would work against my hypothesis. Summary statistics of 
the independent variables by country are presented in table 1. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
most often “market-making,” there is little reason to suggest that increased powers for the European 
Parliament and weakened powers for the member states will lead to increased positive integration. Fur-
thermore, since there is such a strong status-quo bias in the EU given the constrictive and complex de-
cision-making rules in the EU, there is little to suggest that the legislation that is produced at the EU 
level would rollback economic or negative integration. 
17 Government effectiveness refers to the quality of public service provision, the bureaucracy in general, 
the competence of civil servants and the independence of the civil service from political pressures. See 
Kaufmann et al. (2003) for a complete list of sources and breakdown of the indicator’s components. 
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Dependent Variables 
Based on the Annual Reports on Monitoring the Application of European Community Law, each 
violation of the EC Treaty and its associated regulation is coded by the year it occurred 
and tracked according to which stage the violation was settled. The first dependent vari-
able counts the number of violations that occurred in 15 EU member states from 1978 to 
2002.18 The second model then assesses the probability that a violation will be settled by 
the European Court of Justice. If the null hypothesis is correct, the factors that explain 
the relative distribution of violations across countries and time should also explain which 
violations are settled by the European Court of Justice. 
Whether a violation occurred or not can only be determined if it was reported by the 
European Commission, which would have been at the Reasoned Opinion stage,19 and 
registered accordingly in the Annual Reports. The Reasoned Opinion stage is the first step 
in the formal compliance process; there may be many violations which are settled prior to 
being reported, through informal discussions or at the Formal Letter of Notification stage 
(Börzel 2001). Yet, there is no reason to suspect that there is any national bias as a conse-
quence. A summary of how infringements have been detected is given in table 2. If there 
is, then the relative capacity of a state to answer the Commission’s demands before a 
Reasoned Opinion is issued should also be reflected in their relative ability to settle a 
violation before going to the ECJ. 
A violation also cannot be coded as to how it was detected, whether by an individual 
lodging a complaint or the Commission initiating its own investigation. However, the 
Commission relies to a great extent on individual complaints to detect violations. There-
fore, to determine if there is a reporting bias, I include the number of cases referred to 
the ECJ under article 234 of the EC Treaty, per country per year, in both the count and 
probability models as a proxy for this fact.20 Summary statistics for the dependent vari-
ables by country appear in table 3. 
 
                                                          
18 Each violation was coded according to the year the Commission began violation proceedings and not 
the year in which it was settled. 
19 This is the case for almost all violations. There are situations, especially early in the reporting process, 
when the Commission identifies some violations and sends only a Formal Letter of Notification, or 
when the reports state that a violation was dismissed without determining at which stage the violation 
was settled. Recording a violation at the Reasoned Opinion stage is the only consistently reliable method 
to count the number of violations over the time period covered here. 
20 Data originate from Stone Sweet and Brunnel (1999). 
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Table 1: Independent Variables by Country, 1975-2002 (means) 
Member 
State 
Average 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Average 
Bureaucratic 
Effectiveness 
Executive 
Control 
Policy 
Centralization 
Cabinet  
Ideological 
Center of  
Gravity 
Net 
Approval 
 of EU 
Article 234 
References 
Votes in the 
Council 
Total EU 
Trade (% GDP) 
ÖS 1.411 1.6600 6 6 -1.030 13.31 11.75 4 27.5 
DE 1.358 1.7550 8 3 2.6717 47.13 37.33 29 19.0 
DK 1.473 1.9094 7 6 2.3570 19.07 2.88 7 25.0 
SW 1.357 1.7894 4 1 -7.0010 -2.313 5.50 4 22.0 
FI 1.618 1.8700 3 6 -15.235 18.12 2.50 3 17.3 
NE 1.688 2.1648 3 2 -9.3330 72.45 16.30 13 46.7 
BE 1.079 1.4900 6 6 -1.7880 54.03 14.22 12 67.5 
LX 1.552 2.0674 9 2 -18.132 72.24 1.30 4 47.9 
FR 0.9905 1.5410 14.9 8 -3.2117 48.35 20.89 29 16.8 
IT 0.8550 .86333 4 12 1.3311 66.53 18.81 29 13.2 
GR 0.8764 .73108 14.5 12 -3.752 46.46 2.83 12 15.1 
PO 1.2299 1.1172 9 4 4.5657 45.93 2.00 12 28.5 
ES 1.2226 1.6646 12 7 -10.320 50.37 8.54 27 12.9 
IR 1.5424 1.7140 18 12 -6.317 52.60 1.31 7 51.7 
UK 1.9080 2.0557 22 12 13.457 9.433 9.73 29 16.7 
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Table 2: Detection of Infringements 
Cases Detected by the Commission 
Year Total Individual Complaints Parliamentary 
Questions Petitions Total 
Failure to 
Notify1 
2000 2434 1225 15 5 313 896 
2001 2179 1300 5 1 272 607 
2002 2356 1431 30 20 318 607 
2003 2709 1290 23 20 253 1166 
2004 
(EUR 15) 2146 1080 23 13 285 781 
2004 
(EUR 25) 2993 1146 23 13 328 1519 
 
1 This number refers to whether national officials have informed the Commission as to whether EU directives have been implemented or not. 
Source: European Commission (2005), Annual Report Monitoring the Application of European Community Law, Brussels. 
 
Statistical Results 
A negative binomial count regression model was used to estimate the relative effect par-
liamentary institutions and executive agenda-setting power have on the number of viola-
tions.21 The unit of analysis is a country-year.22 Model 1 includes all independent variables 
of interest for fifteen EU member states, while model 2 excludes Austria, Sweden, and 
Finland from the sample.23 Table 4 displays the statistical results with and without a con-
trol for the number of violations committed the previous year. 
                                                          
21 I selected a count model because the dependent variable is heavily skewed to the left with frequent 
values of zero and small, discrete values. The likelihood ratio test on each of the models showed that we 
could reject the hypothesis that there was no overdispersion in the data and the use of a Poisson count 
regression model. 
22 Due to the high number of country-specific and time-constant regressors, the model does not include 
fixed effects; random effects were included instead. Also, auto-correlation is not expected to be a prob-
lem, given that the decision of the Commission to pursue violations in one year is independent of the 
number of violations a state committed the year before. Still, inclusion of a lagged, dependent variable 
did not significantly affect the results. 
23 These three countries were excluded because they only recently joined the EU in 1995. Therefore, we 
could expect that the numbers are artificially low for Austria, Sweden, and Finland, pending the estab-
lishment of increased transnational activity or the expiration of EC Treaty derogations. 
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Table 3: Dependent Variables by Country, 1975-2002 
Member State  
Number of 
EC Treaty 
Violations 
Number of 
Court Cases 
per Year 
Austria mean 3.125 .125 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 7 1 
Germany mean 3.83 .6 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 10 3 
Denmark mean 0.967 0.226 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 4 1 
Sweden mean 1 0 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 2 0 
Finland mean .5 0 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 2 0 
Netherlands mean 1.548 .308 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 5 2 
Belgium mean 4.64 1.54 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 15 5 
Luxembourg mean 1.10 0.88 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 6 4 
France mean 7.48 1.14 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 19 3 
Italy mean 6.55 1.92 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 22 6 
Greece mean 7.57 1.905 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 22 9 
Portugal mean 2.2778 .25 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 6 1 
Spain mean 4.11 .411 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 12 2 
Ireland mean 1.633 .27 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 7 2 
United Kingdom mean 1.654 .385 
 minimum 0 0 
 maximum 7 2 
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Table 4: Initial Results for the Number of Infringements 
 
15 EU Member 
States 
15 EU Member 
States with 
Lagged Dependent  
Variables 
12 EU Member 
States 
12 EU Member 
States with  
Lagged Dependent 
Variables 
-1.599*** -1.237*** -1.567*** -1.041*** Quality of market 
regulation (0.347) (0.310) (0.354) (0.353) 
-0.015 -0.074 -0.025 -0.125 Bureaucratic 
effectiveness (0.277) (0.251) (0.281) (0.266) 
0.021* 0.013 0.022* 0.015 Executive control of 
legislature (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
0.007 -0.008 0.006 -0.011 
Policy centralization 
(0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 Cabinet ideological 
center of gravity (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 National net 
approval of EU (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.241 0.328 0.203 0.220 
Total trade with EU 
(0.362) (0.274) (0.374) (0.349) 
0.023** 0.027*** 0.023** 0.022** Votes in the 
Council (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
0.008* 0.000 0.008* 0.003 Number of article 
234 references (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
 0.056***  0.059*** Lag number of 
treaty violations  (0.007)  (0.009) 
2.187*** 2.199*** 2.083*** 1.945*** 
Constant 
(0.466) (0.349) (0.510) (0.510) 
Observations 234 230 222 221 
Number of member 
states 15 15 12 12 
Wald Chi² 168.29 370.42 157.72 251.32 
Log-likelihood -543.99 -553.09 -521.80 -502.35 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
 
We observe that the single most common factor associated with a violation is the degree 
to which national regulations discriminate against free market exchange. Larger member 
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states, represented by the number of votes on the Council of Ministers, are also associ-
ated with a higher number of violations and statistically significant. This leads us to reject 
the hypothesis that EU law is a function of those states with the most bargaining power. 
However, in addition to the quality of regulation, as an executive’s autonomy increases, 
the number of violations also increases, but only without a lagged dependent variable. 
The result is generated most likely because those countries with high levels of executive 
autonomy, such as Greece and France, violate EU law most often, especially when com-
pared with those states with low levels of executive, autonomy such as the Netherlands 
and Denmark.  
The results are relatively robust. There is a good fit between the actual number of 
violations committed by each country per year and their predicted values generated by the 
model. The average difference between predicted and observed values is less than 0.1%. 
There is a strong linear relationship between the quality of market regulation and the 
number of treaty violations (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Infringements and the Status Quo 
What substantial impact do these factors have on the number of violations states com-
mit? Changing a state’s quality of market regulation by one unit decreases the number of 
violations expected by a factor of .1441 or 85.1% (see table 5 below). 
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Table 5: Change in the Number of Violations 
 15 EU Member States 12 EU Member States 
 Factor Incr./Decr.  
in Count for Unit  
Change in X 
Factor Incr./Decr. 
in Count for One 
S. D. in X 
Factor Incr./Decr.  
in Count for Unit  
Change in X 
Factor Incr./Decr. 
in Count for One 
S. D. in X 
Average quality of 
market regulation -.1441 -.5402 -.1457 -.5357 
(% Change) -85.6 -46.0 -85.4 -46.4 
Executive control 
of legislature 1.0238 0.594 1.028 1.173 
(% Change) 2.4 14.6 2.8 17.3 
Votes in the 
Council 1.024 1.28 1.023 1.30 
(% Change) 2.4 27.3 2.7 30.0 
     
In comparison, both the amount of national executive autonomy and votes in the EC 
Council increase the likelihood of a violation by only around 2%. The evidence therefore 
shows that what policies exist at the national level do affect the pattern of infringements 
observed. Infringements cases are not random. They are caused by objective differences 
the Commission observes between national laws or regulations, and the demands of 
primary EU legislation. 
Next, using probit analysis, table 6 reports the conditional effect the same variables 
have on the probability that a violation would be settled by the ECJ. The unit of analysis, 
now, is the violation itself and the likelihood that the ECJ must impose a settlement. This 
model seeks to determine if national parliamentary influence inhibits the process of com-
pliance. 
The first model assesses whether changes in the status quo determine compliance 
behavior, and none of the factors hypothesized has an effect on the probability of an ECJ 
ruling. The second model tests the enforcement approach to compliance by outlying the 
factors that will affect a state’s interest in complying with EU law. In this case, only rela-
tive support for the EU affected the probability of an infringement, but in the opposite 
direction to that predicted. There are several reasons to be skeptical of these results. 
First, the comparatively low levels for Denmark and the United Kingdom generate 
spurious results by influencing the relative fit of a regression line, when otherwise there 
would be no statistically significant relationship among the remaining member states. 
Second, citizens in these countries may actually rely on the EU and its rules and regula-
tions to reform their national economies through the implementation of better legislation. 
Thus, just as Italy, Greece, and Spain commit a high number of EC Treaty violations, 
their respective national populations support the EU’s efforts to prosecute their own 
states and change regulatory patterns at home (see figure 7). 
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Table 6: Probability of a Court Imposed Settlement 
 Status Quo Change 
Enforcement 
Model 
Procedural 
Politics Full Model 
Full Model 
without 
Public Opinion 
-0.233   -0.112 -0.100 Quality of market 
regulation (0.202)   (0.413) (0.406) 
-0.007 -0.008 -0.004 0.004 0.006 Votes in the 
Council (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
-0.003 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 Number of article 
234 references (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
0.009 0.020* 0.010 0.006 0.007 Number of Treaty 
violations (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) 
 0.004  0.001 -0.001 Cabinet 
ideological center 
of gravity  (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004) 
 0.008**  0.007  National net 
approval of EU  (0.003)  (0.004)  
 0.026  0.413 0.509 Total trade with 
EU  (0.299)  (0.341) (0.326) 
  -0.021* -0.020 -0.031* Executive control 
of legislature   (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
  0.016 0.042 0.036 Policy 
centralization   (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) 
   0.345 0.268 Bureaucratic 
effectiveness    (0.350) (0.335) 
-0.473 -1.171** -0.756** -1.907** -1.365* 
Constant 
(0.314) (0.217) (0.168) (0.630) (0.551) 
Observations 1084 1020 934 870 870 
Wald Chi² 9.33 22.32 9.33 17.29 14.11 
Log-likelihood -532.38 -504.35 -442.93 -418.12 -419.92 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 5%; **significant at 1% 
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Figure 7: Court Cases and Support for the EU 
The third model then tests the procedural dimension alone, and the coefficient for 
executive autonomy is in the predicted direction and statistically significant. However, the 
degree to which committees can monitor the executive is not significant nor in the 
expected direction. We can conclude that the ability of a national executive to shape the 
legislative agenda significantly affects the likelihood of an ECJ ruling. The next two 
models present the results of the full model and a model with EU public opinion 
excluded. Without public opinion in the model, the national executive’s control of the 
legislature reduces the chance of an ECJ settlement.24 The probability of a court 
settlement decreases by approximately 12% from minimum to maximum levels of execu-
tive control, while net approval of EU membership increased the chances of an EU 
settlement by almost 18% (see table 7). 
Moving from countries with extremely low levels of autonomy such as the Nether-
lands, the predicted probability of an ECJ ruling is 25%, while countries with high levels 
of executive autonomy such as the United Kingdom reduce the predicted probability to 
as low as 10% (see figure 8). 
Despite the robustness of the results, the lack of variation over time in the key vari-
ables of interest prevents us from excluding the possibility that other factors specific to 
                                                          
24 Introduction of alternative measures of executive autonomy, including Liphardt’s (1999) measure of 
executive strength, the duration of cabinets, as well as George Tsebelis’ (2002) measure of an executive’s 
control of the legislative process, produced similar results. Siaroff’s (2003) measure is applied here be-
cause it constitutes the most comprehensive measure of executive autonomy or dominance of the legis-
lature currently in the literature. 
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each state affect the 
analysis. Because we 
cannot introduce fixed 
effects into the model, I 
excluded each country 
successively from the 
dataset to determine if 
any country adversely 
influences the results. 
Exclusion of France and 
Italy reduced the statisti-
cal significance of execu-
tive autonomy, but its 
coefficient maintained 
the same direction. 
The statistical analy-
sis produces relatively 
robust results. It also 
makes it clear that the 
ability of a national 
executive to control the 
legislative process influ-
ences settlement activi-
ties. The participation of 
committees as checks and balances on the role of the executive proved not to have a 
statistically significant effect on the rate of settlement. We may be able to tentatively 
conclude, therefore, that when committees are informed about the reasons why a national 
law violates EU law, they may be more likely to consent to the Commission’s legal logic. 
If, however, committees are excluded from the deliberations and then can affect the 
legislative process, they are more likely to hinder the process of compliance. Thus, the 
most important factor affecting the settlement process is the ability of the national execu-
tive to change the legislative status quo easily, when national parliamentarians are not 
included in the compliance process. The settlement patterns of France and Greece remain 
puzzling. Despite high levels of executive autonomy, ECJ rulings are often imposed upon 
them. This may simply be due to the high levels of market discriminatory regulation in 
these countries or due to some additional factor not captured by the model, which inhib-
its deliberation. 
Table 7 
Executive Control of Legislature Predicted Probabilities 
Change from minimum to 
maximum value 
-0.1488 
Change in 1 unit of executive 
control 
-0.0105 
Country Executive 
Control 
ECJ Ruling No ECJ 
Ruling 
Netherlands 3 0.25 0.75 
Italy  4 0.24 0.76 
Belgium 6 0.22 0.78 
Denmark 7 0.21 0.79 
Germany 8 0.20 0.80 
Luxembourg 9 0.19 0.80 
Portugal 10 0.18 0.81 
Spain 12 0.17 0.82 
France 14.1 0.15 0.84 
Greece 14.5 0.15 0.85 
Ireland 18 0.12 0.87 
United Kingdom 22 0.10 0.89 
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Figure 8: Court Cases and Executive Autonomy 
IV. Conclusion: The Legitimacy Dimension 
The results presented here demonstrate that increasing the amount of democratic legiti-
macy in the process of European governance can inhibit its effectiveness in the area of 
compliance with EU primary legislation, namely the EC Treaty. Mechanisms associated 
with either the enforcement or management schools of compliance fail to explain the 
cross-national variation in the number of violations or in the process of settling those 
violations. To the extent that there are conflicts between national law and EU law, allow-
ing national parliaments to participate in the deliberative and legislative process of com-
pliance increases the chances that the European Court of Justice will impose a settlement 
upon the member state. Thus, the politics of the compliance process matter as much as, 
but are different from, the sources of these violations. 
These findings have important consequences for the future of European integration. 
The most effective method to reduce the number of infringements of EU law is to raise 
the level of democratic participation in the EU policymaking process, although there will 
always be winners and losers in this process. Due to the current condition of support for 
increased political integration in the EU, this proposition has a relatively low probability 
of succeeding. A second solution to the problem of less democratic legitimacy is to make 
full use of EU directives, which enables member states to devise their own national solu-
tions to EU objectives. Yet, assuming that the European Commission is driving the 
process of European integration and can serve as an agenda setter in the EU policymak-
ing process, it is inevitable that disputes will develop between EU and national law, for 
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which the ECJ is the solely responsible adjudicator. The remaining national institution 
capable of defending the national status quo and laws approved by a democratic majority 
is a national constitutional court or its equivalent across the member states. However, 
even in this case, the legal and political relationship between constitutional courts, if they 
exist, and national governments vary considerably according to the extent to which they 
can serve as a check on legislative activities. Moreover, national courts themselves often 
served as the engines of European integration by subsuming their authority under EU 
legal doctrine. Therefore, the last resort states face when confronted with conflicts be-
tween national and EU law is exit from the institution itself, an extremely remote possibil-
ity. However, unless democratic pathways are created, which allow EU citizens to shape 
the legislative process in the European Union, through their national parliamentary repre-
sentatives, such that EU law conflicts less with national laws, EU membership will in-
creasingly contain fewer privileges and more onerous legal obligations. 
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